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WHAT IS CLAIMED IS:

1. A broadcast encryption method, comprising the steps of:

allocating, to each of a plurality of subscribers, a corresponding set of subscriber keys;

broadcasting encrypted content to the plurality of subscribers using a set of broadcast keys, wherein the encrypted content is decoded by a given subscriber using the subscriber's corresponding set of subscriber keys;

modifying the set of broadcast keys, which are used for broadcasting encrypted content, by excluding compromised subscriber keys; and

updating a set of subscriber keys corresponding to at least one subscriber when the at least one subscriber's set of subscriber keys comprises an amount of active keys that falls below a first predetermined threshold.

- 2. The method of claim 1, wherein each set of subscriber keys is encoded on a smartcard that is issued to the corresponding subscriber.
 - 3. The method of claim 2, further comprising the steps of:

identifying a compromised smartcard; and

identifying each subscriber key contained on the compromised smartcard as a compromised key.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein a compromised smartcard comprises one of a pirate smartcard and a smartcard of an excluded subscriber.

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5. The method of claim 4, wherein the step of updating comprises the steps of: tracking a total amount of compromised cards; and

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reissuing a smartcard comprising the updated set of subscriber keys when the total

amount of compromised cards meets a second predefined threshold.

- 6. The method of claim 1, wherein the first predetermined threshold is one key.
- 7. A broadcast encryption method, comprising the steps of:

allocating a set of subscriber keys to each of a plurality of n subscribers, wherein each set of subscriber keys is generated by randomly selecting r keys from a universal set comprising K keys;

broadcasting encrypted content to the n subscribers using a set of broadcast keys S_p selected from the universal set of keys;

identifying at least one compromised subscriber key;

adjusting S_p by excluding the at least one compromised subscriber key; and updating a set of subscriber keys corresponding to at least one subscriber when the at least one subscriber's set of subscriber keys comprises an amount of active keys that falls below a first predetermined threshold.

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8. The method of claim 7, wherein the step of allocating is performed using a randomized broadcast encryption scheme wherein K is selected to ensure an (m,α) cover free family with high probability that the sets of subscriber keys corresponding to a

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coalition of m subscribers can not cover a fraction α of r keys comprising the set of subscriber keys of another subscriber.

- 9. The method of claim 8, wherein the step of broadcasting is performed using an $(\alpha r, |S_p|)$ threshold broadcast protocol.
 - 10. The method of claim 9, wherein ar=1
- 11. The method of claim 7, wherein each set of subscriber keys is encoded on a separate smartcard that is issued to the corresponding subscriber.
 - 12. The method of claim 11, wherein the step of identifying at least one compromised subscriber key comprises the steps of:

identifying a compromised smartcard; and

- identifying each subscriber key contained on the compromised card as a compromised key.
- 13. The method of claim 12, wherein a compromised smartcard comprises one of a pirate smartcard and a smartcard of an excluded subscriber.
 - 14. The method of claim 12, wherein the step of updating comprises the steps of: tracking a total amount of compromised smartcards; and

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reissuing a smartcard comprising the updated set of subscriber keys when the total amount of compromised cards meets a second predefined threshold d.

- 15. The method of claim 14, wherein d is substantially equal to K/r.
- 16. The method of claim 14, wherein the step of reissuing comprises the steps of: generating a new key for each compromised key to update the universal set of keys; and

randomly selecting r keys from the updated universal set of keys to generate the updated set of subscriber keys.

- 17. The method of claim 14, wherein K, r and d are selected to obtain a bound on the number of subscribers that are reissued smartcards in recarding sessions.
- 18. A program storage device readable by a machine, tangibly embodying a program of instructions executable by the machine to perform method steps for performing broadcast encryption, the method steps comprising:

allocating, to each of a plurality of subscribers, a corresponding set of subscriber keys;

broadcasting encrypted content to the plurality of subscribers using a set of broadcast keys, wherein the encrypted content is decoded by a given subscriber using the subscriber's corresponding set of subscriber keys;

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modifying the set of broadcast keys, which are used for broadcasting encrypted content, by excluding compromised subscriber keys; and

updating a set of subscriber keys corresponding to at least one subscriber when the at least one subscriber's set of subscriber keys comprises an amount of active keys that falls below a first predetermined threshold.

19. The program storage device of claim 18, further comprising instructions for performing the step of:

identifying each subscriber key contained on a compromised smartcard as a compromised key.

20. The program storage device of claim 19, wherein the instructions for performing the step of updating comprise instructions for performing the steps of:

tracking a total amount of compromised cards; and

encoding a smartcard with the updated set of subscriber keys when the total amount of compromised cards meets a second predefined threshold.

- 21. The program storage device of claim 18, wherein the first predetermined threshold comprises one key.
- 22. A program storage device readable by a machine, tangibly embodying a program of instructions executable by the machine to perform method steps for broadcast encryption, the method comprising the steps of:

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allocating a set of subscriber keys to each of a plurality of n subscribers, wherein each set of subscriber keys is generated by randomly selecting r keys from a universal set comprising K keys;

broadcasting encrypted content to the n subscribers using a set of broadcast keys S_p selected from the universal set of keys;

identifying at least one compromised subscriber key;

adjusting S_p by excluding the at least one compromised subscriber key; and updating a set of subscriber keys corresponding to at least one subscriber when the at least one subscriber's set of subscriber keys comprises an amount of active keys that falls below a first predetermined threshold.

23. The program storage device of claim 22, wherein the instructions for performing the step of allocating comprise instructions for performing a randomized broadcast encryption scheme wherein K is selected to ensure an (m,α) cover free family with high probability that the sets of subscriber keys corresponding to a coalition of m subscribers can not cover a fraction α of r keys comprising the set of subscriber keys of another subscriber.